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I. Introduction
Judicial systems are asked to satisfy multiple goals, including
retribution, deterrence, factfinding, and moral education, but the
emphasis placed on those various goals may sometimes differ
from system to system. Specifically, an international criminal
tribunal which decides cases involving gross violations of human
rights may properly emphasize goals that are not at the forefront of
domestic criminal justice systems, such as state systems within the
United States.' Such international courts often perceive their
responsibilities to include developing an historical account of
events and teaching a sense of accountability.2 As to differing
goals, comparison of the effectiveness of systems is of little
interest.
In this Article, I focus on several basic goals shared by
judicial systems and address the issue of which criminal justice
system-the adversarial or the contemporary continental
inquisitorial system-better satisfies the common and often central
goal of accurate factfinding. Because my relative advantage in
familiarity is with the American adversarial system, I will spend
the majority of my effort critiquing the inadequacies of the
American adversarial model with regard to accuracy, with an
emphasis on avoiding unjust convictions. My specific point of
concentration for analysis of the American adversarial system is
its demonstrated failings in convicting the innocent, as shown by
recent exonerations, which often occur after the innocent
I See, e.g., Mirjan Damalka, Problematic Features of International Criminal
Procedure, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 175, 177
(Antonio Cassese ed., 2009).
2 Id.
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defendant has spent many years in prison.'
These cases were typically exonerations based on evidence
acquired through post-conviction DNA testing. These revelations
often occurred as the result of the happenstance that many
innocent defendants were convicted before DNA identification
technology matured, but their charged crimes-principally rape
and murder-left behind dispositive biological trace evidence.4
This evidence had been gathered by investigators and, in the cases
of the fortunate, preserved and reexamined with new technology.
We cannot know how many more defendants were wrongfully
convicted since for many, no trace evidence was gathered or
retained to be available for subsequent testing. As a matter of
logic, many more were falsely convicted than the several hundred
of which we are aware.5
Wrongful convictions are recognized as the most serious type
of system error and have great salience in the Anglo-American
system of justice. 6 The critical importance the public places upon
3 See generally, Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005) (examining 340 exonerations
the authors were able to document during the period from 1989 through 2003); Brandon
L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55 (2008) (examining what the
author describes as the first 200 individuals exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing
in the U.S.).
4 See Garrett, supra note 3, at 75-76; Gross et al., supra note 3, at 528-332.
5 See Garrett, supra note 3 at 127-128.
6 In comparatively examining the basic features of the adversarial and the
inquisitorial systems, Professor Damaika recognized the obvious point, which is not
frequently noted in most contemporary examinations with erroneous convictions, that
maximizing accuracy and the avoidance of convicting the innocent are conceptually
distinct concerns. See Mirjan Damaika, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two
Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 508
(1973). As Damatka stated, "factfinding precision in the total volume of criminal cases
may . . . even be decreased." Id. Clearly, higher barriers to conviction do help to
minimize erroneous convictions of the innocent, but they also increase erroneous
acquittals of the guilty as well.
Professor Ronald Wright has argued that publicity regarding wrongful
convictions revealed by DNA testing could provide a popular basis for public defender
funding "framed as an investment in accuracy." See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Parity of
Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 lOWA L. REV.
219, 261 (2004) (effectively equating the two concerns, which is understandable given
the predominant importance placed on avoiding unjust convictions in contemporary
discourse). These conceptually inconsistent goals may, however, coalesce to some
degree as societal values are weighed in the process that treats false convictions (known
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these errors can be seen in the way the public has responded with
great concern to DNA exonerations.' One of the most troubling
points many of these exonerations demonstrated was that despite
the criminal justice system's theoretical commitment to special
vigilance against those types of errors, even in crimes subject to
capital punishment, cases that presumably received the best
process the American system can provide, the innocent have been
convicted.'
Of course, no human factfinding system will be perfect. A
system that handles millions of cases, and is staffed by hundreds
of thousands of individuals spread throughout this vast country,
will almost inevitably produce a sizeable number of errors.
However, I believe a substantial number of these errors can be
traced to clear flaws in the design of the American criminal justice
system and are not the result of ordinary human fallibility.
as Type I errors or false positives) as more significant than erroneous acquittals (Type II
errors or false negatives). See Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and
Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L.
REv. 323, 380 (2008) ("Incorporating a deontological constraint against (risking) false
convictions may thus yield a more satisfactory analysis."). The strong western
commitment to err on the side of protecting the innocent is captured in the adage that it is
better that ten guilty men be acquitted than one innocent man be convicted, which is
found in the English writings of both Matthew Hale and William Blackstone. See SIR
MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN: A METHODICAL SUMMARY 289 (1678); 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; but see Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan,
Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 65 (2008) (championing Jeremy Bentham's
view that society tends to overly value the danger of unjust convictions and arguing
accuracy in preventing unjust convictions should be given greater prominence in
reforms).
7 See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E.
BOYDSTON, THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE IN
AMERICA (2008) (describing how the stories of exonerations of those on death row
through DNA transformed American attitudes toward the death penalty).
8 See Gross et al., supra note 3, at 529. Of 340 exonerations from false
convictions, seventy-four were innocent defendants exonerated in cases that involved a
sentence of death. The reason for the high number of innocent defendants exonerated in
capital cases may be because more innocent defendants are actually falsely convicted in
murder cases, as well the level of attention and emphasis placed on exonerating those
falsely convicted in such cases. Id. at 532. See also Garrett, supra note 3, at 91-92
(noting that among the first 200 individuals exonerated by DNA that fourteen had been
convicted of capital crimes). This observation extends also to those crimes that are
subject to capital punishment. Even the Supreme Court has taken notice of the number
of innocent defendants wrongly convicted of capital crimes. Many of these cases were
decided upon weak evidence in the difficult cases of proving stranger homicide. Id.
322
2011] FAILURES OF THE AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
The specific international focus of this Article is in exploring
the possibility that differences in the institutional identification of
those responsible for investigation in the inquisitorial criminal
justice system may alleviate a key structural impediment to
accuracy in the American adversarial system in protecting the
innocent. In the first two parts of this Article, I examine failings
within the American criminal justice system that prevent the
American system from achieving the maximum potential of the
adversarial model.
In Part I, I discuss two major failings of the American
criminal justice system. 9 Most fundamentally, state systems,
where the vast majority of criminal cases are tried, inadequately
fund defense representation for indigent defendants, who
constitute the bulk of those charged.o That effectively means that
the prosecution lacks an effective opponent to challenge its
allegations and evidence." A second failure is to provide full
discovery in criminal cases.12 Affording full discovery in the
criminal justice system could at least in part ameliorate the
limitations of defense resources to investigate and present the
facts." These features of the American criminal justice system are
widespread, persistent, and fundamental.
In Part II, I examine the role of the prosecutor. An essential
feature of American justice is the recognized duty of the
9 While not discussed in this Article, I recognize that the American criminal
justice system arguably has other equally serious basic problems, such as its
extraordinary reliance on the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463 (2004) (discussing the
evils of plea bargaining but recognizing its important functions and likely longevity).
However, I contend the lack of adequate counsel in combination with the failure of the
system to compensate for inadequate counsel is significantly more damaging to the cause
of justice than are the abuses flowing from excessive reliance on guilty pleas.
10 See generally, Mary Sue Backus, The Adversary System is Dead; Long Live the
Adversary System: The Judge as the Great Equalizer in Criminal Trials, 2008 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 945, 953-61 (2008) (describing the failings of the state system due to inadequate
funding).
11 See generally id. at 975-76 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest For Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 285 (1963)). The process
of discovery is the chance to level the playing field between the defense and the
prosecution.
12 See id. at 975-77.
13 See id.
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prosecutor "to do justice." This duty could help offset the defense
inadequacies discussed in Part I. However, despite its potential,
the duty of the prosecutor "to do justice" does not effectively
compensate for those failures because the prosecutor cannot fully
shed the adversarial mantel. Moreover, in modem criminal
prosecutions, the prosecutor has effectively become not only an
advocate but also the adjudicator in determining the resolution of
the case through the omnipresent practice of plea bargaining as a
substitute for trial. 14 In addition, not only theoretical analysis, but
also the insightful new application of recognized psychological
theory and empirical research regarding the biasing effect of the
American prosecutor's role to try the case as an advocate,
demonstrate that he or she cannot perform the fact-gathering role
neutrally as a consequence of that role's unconscious distortions of
rational evaluation and even accurate memory. I propose reforms,
some of which are obvious, for each of these failings.
In Part III, I examine the clear suggestion of new
psychological scholarship that the inquisitorial, judicially-led
prosecution is theoretically superior to the present American
prosecutorial structure in ensuring fairness and accuracy, which is
particularly important when protecting the innocent is given
primacy. '" The issue is whether the ultimate task assigned to
inquisitorial judges-to decide the guilt of the defendant fairly-
enables them to gather and evaluate evidence more neutrally than
American prosecutors, whose ultimate role is to persuade the
factfinder as a partisan advocate."
II. The Failure of the American Adversarial System to Have a
Second Advocate, the Defense
A. Inadequate Funding for Indigent Defense, Particularly
Indigent Defense Outside the Federal System
Despite the constitutional command that counsel be provided
14 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 9.
15 See Dan Simon, Doug Senstrom & Stephen J. Read, Adversarial and Non-
Adversarial Investigations: An Experiment (May 15, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1401723.
16 See id.
[Vol. XXXVI324
2011] FAILURES OF THE AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
for indigents in felony cases," many have noted the lack of
funding for state defenders." The American Bar Association has
prepared two major reports on indigent funding, nearly twenty
years apart, revealing essentially the same fundamental funding
inadequacies in the vast majority of states. 9 In 1982, after an
extensive survey and analysis of funding in forty states, the
Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
summarized the state of representation as follows: "Overall, there
is abundant evidence in this report that defense services for the
poor are inadequately funded. As a result, millions of persons
who have a constitutional right to counsel are denied effective
legal representation."2 0
In 2004, the ABA reexamined the situation and found
17 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (mandating that counsel be
provided for all indigents in felony cases in order to comply with the Sixth Amendment).
18 See, e.g., Backus, supra note 10, at 952-61 (summarizing and citing the
consistent and uniform analysis of the state indigent defense systems as continually
underfunded); see generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045-1053 (2006) ("By every
measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the defense function
for poor people is drastically underfinanced."); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's
Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835,
845-857 (2004) (summarizing that "overall this nation's systems for providing counsel
to the indigent are still very inadequate" and detailing the basis for that conclusion).
This literature also includes numerous articles recounting injustices in individual cases
that resulted from inadequate representation, including cases involving the death penalty.
See, e.g, Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial ofLegal
Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783
(1997); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration of Systemic Problem?,
2006 Wis. L. REV. 739, 748-79 (2006).
19 In the middle of this time period, an ABA committee examined funding and
reached similar conclusions. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE
Soc'Y, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 37 (1988) (the ABA Criminal Justice Section's
Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society reporting that "defense
representation is too often inadequate" because "we, as a society, [are] depriving the
system of the funds necessary to ensure adequate defense services"); A.B.A. STANDING
COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7 (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter ABA
Report 2004].
20 NORMAN LEFSTEIN, A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS
FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING 2
(1982). This report was prepared in a cooperative effort between the ABA committee
and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Id.
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essentially the same woeful lack of funding in addition to
problems of delivery of these limited resources. It stated:
Too often when attorneys are provided, crushing
workloads make it impossible for them to devote sufficient
time to their cases, leading to widespread breaches of
professional obligations. To make matters worse,
exceedingly modest compensation deters private attorneys
from performing more than the bare minimum required for
payment. Further, the structure of indigent defense
systems often means that judges and/or state and county
officials control the attorneys, thereby denying them the
professional independence afforded to their prosecution
counterparts and to their colleagues retained by paying
clients.2 1
The impact of the failure of states and localities to fund
indigent defense adequately removes an essential ingredient of the
adversary system, and in a massive number of cases there is no
effective opponent to the prosecution. Indeed, it alters the basic
character of American justice from its essential adversarial design.
As the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free."2 2
In the United States, over 80% of those charged with felonies
are indigent.23 In addition, many of the others judged not to be
indigent under the varying standards used24 are no doubt of modest
means and frequently receive marginal representation with little or
no investigation to develop evidence to challenge the factual
picture presented by the prosecution.25 Also, although federal
21 See ABA Report 2004, supra note 19, at 7.
22 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
23 See Uphoff, supra note 18, at 748.
24 See id. at 748-49.
25 See id. at 781. In Part III of this Article, I discuss the theoretical superiority of
the judicially supervised investigation under the inquisitorial model. That superiority
could be swamped by the increased accuracy gained if the finder of fact were presented
with more evidence, albeit adversarial motivated evidence. Due to the inadequacy of
defense funding, the potential compensating advantage of more evidence, some of it
provided by the defense, is generally lost. As discussed in Part II, the American
prosecutor, who has the resources to conduct a thorough investigation and produce a full
display of the evidence, is impaired by unconscious biases even to perceive all the
326 [Vol. XXXVI
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criminal law is expanding, criminal justice remains the
responsibility of states and localities predominantly, rather than
the responsibility of the federal criminal system.26  As measured
by those incarcerated, 87.5% of inmates are confined in state
prisons, thus only 12.5% are confined in the federal system. 27
When those housed in jails, which are typically the responsibility
of localities rather than the states, are also included, the percentage
accounting for state and local incarcerations increases to 91.4%,
and the federal percentage dips to 8.6%.28
This basic failure of our purported adversarial system to
provide adequately paid and supported defense advocates has
frequently been noted.29 However, I believe there is a sound
reason to consider it the most serious challenge to justice in the
United States. Most procedural protections granted in landmark
Supreme Court opinions require the assistance of a skilled lawyer
to develop and assert the rights effectively.30 Many defenses can
evidence that is potentially available to exculpate and therefore defeat the case the
prosecutor is charged with developing. As discussed in Part III, despite the conceptual
superiority of more neutral judicial investigation that is part of the French inquisitorial
system, common social bonds and institutional affiliation between judicial officers who
serve as prosecutors and other judicial officers who evaluate the case as the juge
d'instruction tends to undermine neutrality. See JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CRIME IN FRANCE 223 (2005). The French inquisitorial system also marginalizes the
defense, and therefore may reduce even further the potential for production of additional
helpful information at the important pre-trial stage. Id. at 222.
26 See Heather C. West & William J. Sabol, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2008
Statistical, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 3, tbl.2 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.ojp.jusdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/pim08st.htm (last updated Apr. 8, 2009). From
the end of 2000 through mid-year 2008, the federal prison population grew faster than
the state prison population in general, with a percentage of change of 38%, and the
federal system passed both those of Texas and California to house the largest prison
population at the end of the period. Id. In terms of all inmates held in state or federal
prisons or local jails, the increase of those held in federal prisons was from 7.2% to 8.6%
(percentage change of 19%). Id. at 16, tbl. 15.
27 See id. at 3, tbl. 2 (reporting that the total federal and state prison population was
1,601,584 and the federal prison population was 201,142).
28 See id. at 3, tbl.2, and 16, tbl.15 (reporting that the total held in federal or state
prisons or local jails was 2,310,984 and those in federal custody was 201,142, the federal
prison population being 198,402).
29 See, e.g. Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, Symposium: Broke and Broken: Can We
Fix Our State Indigent Defense System?, 75 Mo. L. REV. 667 (2010).
30 For example, the right to a trial by jury, to present a defense, and to confront
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be independently recognized and accepted by prosecutors, but
most cases proceed to the charging stage because of the apparent
guilt of the defendant, and the complexity of the defense or
ambiguity of the facts. 3 This difficult environment requires
skilled development of the evidence and the ability and resources
to bring them before the finder of fact in an understandable and
persuasive form. Without adequate assistance of counsel and
supporting services, much of what the American justice system
prizes in terms of rights, fairness, and accuracy simply fails to
materialize.3 2
Thus, the failure to provide adequate representation, which I
believe is an uncontestable fact for a large percentage, if not a
majority, of those charged with crimes in the United States, should
be among the most prominent issues in criminal justice circles and
in academic literature. However, it is not. One reason may be that
to protest the situation is the equivalent of "tilting at windmills."
As Professor Darryl Brown states, "[f]orty years after Gideon v.
Wainwright, this political limit on defense counsel [underfunding]
is a fixed component of criminal justice; underfunding of defense
will not change except at the margins."" I suspect that another
reason indigent counsel underfunding in the states has not received
the degree of attention it deserves as a truly fundamental challenge
is because the federal system generally provides much better
witnesses have little meaning in most cases for most defendants without the assistance of
skilled counsel.
31 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care
About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 11 (2009) (stating that assumption of guilt
appears to be the premise under which most criminal cases operate).
32 Cf William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 75 (1997) ("Gideon and the reasonable doubt rule are
essential to any adversarial system that takes accuracy rather seriously."); Robert P.
Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for
Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 Mo. L. REV. 931 (2010) (arguing that
effective counsel is critical to protecting the large class of innocent defendants who lack
conclusive proof of their innocence).
33 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline ofDefense Counsel and the Rise ofAccuracy
in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1590 (2005) (making this assertion
and linking it to the legislative decision to limit defense counsels' effectiveness because
of representation of guilty clients' interests and lack of focus on accuracy in
adjudication).
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funding in comparison.34 Most major American academics are
concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with the federal criminal
system.
B. The Failure of the American Criminal Justice System to
Compensate for Inadequate Defense Resources through
Full Disclosure of the Prosecutor's Case to Facilitate its
Testing at Trial, In the Rare Instance When that Event
Occurs
The inadequate funding of most indigent defenders, even if
not treated with the alarm it merits, is a documented reality that
would be difficult to remedy by the states even if correction were
34 See Inga L. Parsons, "Making it a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent
Representation, 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 837, 840 ("During these conversations I would
think how lucky I was to be in the federal system where the culture of lawyering was
based on traditional notions of adversarial advocacy and manageable caseloads"). I have
indicated an allocation system that attempted to allocate services in line with what a
lower middle class individual would secure with their own funds. See Mosteller, supra
note 31, at 10. Even this relatively generous funding in comparison to other indigent
support is for many lawyers below their ordinary market rate. See Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law,
61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 881, 882 n.55 (2009) (citing effort to increase pay rates for
appointed attorneys in the federal system because the existing rate does not even offset
overhead costs). Professors Marc Miller and Ronald Wright are clear exceptions in
treating state criminal adjudications as central to understanding criminal procedure. See
Robert Weisberg, A New Legal Realism for Criminal Procedure, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 909
(2001) (describing the new casebook on criminal procedure as "the most original
criminal procedure book in many years" because of its focus on state applications and
decisions rather than Supreme Court decisions).
35 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 870, 873, n.15 (beginning the article by noting the
recent growth of the federal prison system population and then focusing exclusively on
the organization of the prosecutor's office in the federal system). The undue attention
that I believe American academics pay to federal criminal prosecutions and the workings
of the federal system is apparently not a phenomenon unique to the United States.
Professor Jacqueline Hodgson believes that similar skewed attention occurs in England
and Wales, where the Crown Court jury trial is frequently treated as the norm even
though most cases are handled without juries by lay judges in magistrate courts, and in
France, where the principal attention is given to instruction, even though this procedure
is used in less than 5% of French criminal cases. See E-mail from Jacqueline Hodgson,
to Robert Mosteller & Michael Corrado (Nov. 11, 2009, 7:59 EST) (on file with author)
(describing how in both of these systems most emphasis is placed on the relatively rare
procedures); HODGSON, supra note 25, at 209 (noting that less than 5% of cases are
handled in France through the instruction).
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politically popular.3 ' This is because of the significant impact that
remedy would have on state and local budgets, which are already
facing serious deficits. Some potentially compensating procedural
reforms are not costly to public funds but still not embraced. I
examine here the important but incomplete aid to fairness to the
defense that would be provided by full discovery of the
prosecution's evidence.
In contrast to the inquisitorial model, American trials do not
occur based on the developed investigative dossier. Instead, they
proceed from a prosecutor-developed file, disclosed to the
factfinder as counsel chooses to present it, and a defense-
developed file, also disclosed according to defense counsel's
direction. Exchange of information between adversaries from
their respective investigative files occurs before trial in the
procedure termed "discovery" in the American adversarial system.
Inadequacies in defense preparation could be offset by disclosures
from the prosecution in many cases, effectively reducing some of
the resource disparities faced by the defense by providing
investigative information.
For cases resolved without trial through guilty pleas,
inadequate resources for the defense have an effect both on the
level of effort and on the amount of scrutiny the charge receives
before resolution that is not subject to amelioration through formal
discovery. Unfortunately, resolution by guilty plea occurs in the
vast majority of cases, and trials in criminal cases are rare events
in American jurisdictions.37 Even in those rare situations when a
trial occurs, which should involve disproportionately the highest
percentage of innocent defendants, inadequate defense support
36 Professor Darryl Brown has noted the lack of popularity with state legislatures of
the goal of providing an effective defense to all those accused of crime. See Brown,
supra note 33, at 1590. In this time of budget shortfalls, cash strapped states and
localities must choose which important services to limit or eliminate. It is hard to
believe that providing indigent defense services will win out in the competition for
scarce dollars when competing against such popular and socially valuable services as
public schools, medical care, and highways, to name a few.
37 Only about 10% of criminal cases in the entire U.S. are resolved by trial, and in
the federal system, the trend in recent years has pushed that rate down to less than half
the national average. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge
Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003) (noting the national rate of 90% guilty
pleas in resolving cases and the recent increase in the federal guilty plea percentage that
increased approximately 10% from 85.4% in 1991 to 96.6% in 2001).
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continues to have largely the same significant impact on fairness.
Other than the in-court performance of counsel, which even if
exemplary is usually not an adequate substitute for a well-
developed case, resource inadequacy is one of the factors that
most impairs accurate resolution of a case.
Even during a trial, the unnecessary impediment of limited
discovery provided in criminal cases in most American
jurisdictions stands in the way of the adversarial model reaching
its potential promise. A prominent recent American spectacle, the
Duke lacrosse case, brought disrepute to aspects of the criminal
justice system when three members of the Duke University
lacrosse team were indicted on rape charges for an offense that
clearly never occurred.3 8 One of the major reasons the spectacle
did not produce a systemic debacle was that North Carolina, the
state in which the case occurred, had recently enacted a broad
system of discovery in criminal cases.3 9 Those provisions were
critical to the exoneration of the defendants and the disbarment of
the prosecutor who secured the indictments and carried the
prosecution forward.4 0
In contrast to the extensive discovery that is part of civil
litigation, American criminal procedure traditionally provides only
limited discovery in criminal cases. Given that the "stakes" are
often higher in criminal cases, this state of affairs appears
backward. However, more restrictive criminal discovery has been
historically justified by three main arguments: first, broader
discovery permits criminal defendants to develop effective
perjured testimony to counter the newly-revealed details the
prosecution will offer; second, broad disclosures will reveal
identifying information regarding prosecution witnesses and will
38 See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False
Identifications: A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice, " 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337,
1341-47 (2007) (describing the event and the basis for the decision of the North Carolina
Attorney General to dismiss charges and declare the defendants innocent).
39 See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the
Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 262-76 (2008) (describing the chain of events that produced
the broad criminal discovery statute in North Carolina).
40 See id. at 285-318 (2008) (describing the impact of the availability of full open-
file discovery on the progression of the case leading to dismissal of charges against the
defendants and the disbarment of the prosecutor).
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permit witness intimidation; and third, because the defendant is
protected by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, reciprocal disclosures required of the defense will
inevitably be more limited.41 In essence, the argument against
further discovery is that broader discovery for the criminal
defendant would tilt the balance of advantage, which already
favors the defendant as a result of various procedural protections,
too far in the defense's favor.4 2
Recently enacted discovery reforms have made North
Carolina's criminal discovery system among the most liberal in
the country, and these provisions provide substantially more
extensive discovery to the defense than does the federal system. 43
The changes in North Carolina occurred because of a widely
publicized case involving apparently serious prosecutorial
misconduct in the withholding of exculpatory evidence.44 A
defendant sentenced to death but likely innocent was spared
execution because of exculpatory evidence that was revealed by a
recently-enacted, expansive discovery statute that was limited to
death penalty cases, which the legislature then broadened to cover
all felony prosecutions. 45 The national trend is in the direction of
broader criminal discovery, but discovery in criminal cases
remains restricted in comparison to its civil counterpart. There is
no indication that rapid expansion of criminal discovery will occur
41 See generally, 5 WAYNE R. LEAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.1(b) (3d
ed. 2007).
42 See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 273 (describing the justifications for narrow
criminal discovery, including the fear that greater discovery will add to the defendant's
existing procedural advantages, such as the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and would be an advantage to the defense in litigation).
43 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, § 20.1(c), at 355 & n.48, § 20.2(b), at 365-66
& n.34, at 367 & n.41 (placing North Carolina's criminal discovery statute among the
five that are the most expansive and are in line with the scope of the third edition of the
ABA Standards and noting that North Carolina goes further than any other jurisdiction in
authorizing defense discovery from the prosecution but that in other areas, Florida's
provisions provide broader discovery).
44 See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 262-76 (describing the facts of the Alan Gell
case and the failure to disclose numerous items of exculpatory evidence in the initial
trial, the limited disciplinary action taken against the prosecutors in the initial trial, the
quick acquittal on retrial, and the discovery reforms that provide "full open-file
discovery" to all felony defendants that was enacted as a result of the case).
45 Id.
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in the near future.
In the preceding subsection, I noted that the federal system
generally provides reasonably adequate funding to indigent
defense services and speculated that that state of affairs might
lessen academic attention to the persistent and important problem
with funding in the states. With regard to discovery, the federal
system is not taking the lead in its expansion. This is likely
because many more defendants in federal court, which includes a
disproportionally high percentage of white-collar crime, organized
crime, and terrorism prosecutions, 46 fit the most common
justifications for limited discovery. Nevertheless, the fact that
criminal discovery in the federal system is limited and is likely to
remain that way is a reason to presume that expansion in the states
will, at best, move slowly.
Restrictive discovery is not inconsistent with the idea of an
adversarial model and indeed it is fully consistent with each side
establishing and presenting its own case. It is, however,
inconsistent with a fair and effective adversarial model if one of
the two adversaries is woefully under-resourced, as is the situation
in what is likely a clear majority of criminal cases and even felony
prosecutions in the United States. Broad discovery could be a
partial offset to inadequate defense resources as the defense
benefits from the investigative resources available to the
prosecution, and the present limitations on criminal discovery
exacerbate the consequences of inadequately funded indigent
defenders. Without adequate resources, denying the defense full
access to the prosecution's files and those of the investigative
agencies within the executive branch denies the opportunity for a
full and effective adversarial testing of the facts. This problem
plagues cases resolved either by a plea of guilty or by a trial.
Indeed its impact may be most damaging to the accurate resolution
of those cases that are resolved short of a trial because at trial
much of the prosecution's evidence is exposed to open scrutiny as
46 See, e.g., A. Kenneth Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33
F.R.D. 47, 91 (1963) (acknowledging that the dangers of perjury, bribery, and
intimidation are greatest with respect to expanded discovery in organized crime cases);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
525 (2001) (noting that the biggest areas of expansion of federal criminal law in the
1970s and 1980s were organized crime and white collar crime).
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it is presented to the finder of fact.47
The American adversarial system has another important
response to the flaw in adversarial testing produced by defense
resource inadequacy. Unlike the defense counsel, the prosecutor
is not envisioned as acting as an unconstrained advocate of his or
her cause. Instead, by tradition, ethical command, 48 and
constitutional provision,4 prosecutors are charged with the duty
47 1 note in Part 11, the important but inadequate responsibility of the prosecution to
ensure justice, which includes the obligation to provide exculpatory evidence. Full,
open-file discovery eliminates the problems in disclosing exculpatory evidence because
it requires the disclosure of all prosecution evidence, removing the need for the
prosecution to decide what evidence is exculpatory, which entails a difficult decision by
counsel in the adversarial system to recognize which evidence may help his or her
opponent. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 310 (noting the obvious "beauty" of full
open-file discovery in this regard).
48 With regard to ethics, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists
because: 1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use
restraint in the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the
selection of cases to prosecute; 2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an
advocate but he may also make decisions normally made by an individual
client, and those affecting the public interest should be fair to all; and 3) in our
system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable
doubts.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980). See also "Special
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor," MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (1983).
49 In terms of tradition, the Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) made the following statement:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963),
holds that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to provide potentially
exculpatory evidence to the defense. Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct requires "timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,
and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
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not to pursue the advocate's victory for his or her side but rather to
seek justice."o In theory and practice, that responsibility is one of
the most important in achieving justice in the American system of
criminal justice. I spent seven years as a public defender in
Washington, D.C. and was privileged to practice opposite
members of the United States Attorney's Office, who took this
responsibility seriously. That duty is critical, but as discussed in
the next section, it is inadequate for a number of institutional and
practical reasons.
C. Suggested Reforms
The appropriate reforms that would counter the weaknesses I
have identified are obvious. They are adequate funding for
indigent defense services and more complete discovery. The
former may be politically/fiscally impractical. "' The second
reform, which would help alleviate the disparities in resources, is
quite achievable and should be implemented.
The prosecutorial duty to ensure that justice is done, which
has several concrete manifestations in the legal and ethical
doctrine, has been noted at several points in Part I. It is obviously
a deviation from the pure adversarial model, because it requires
one party to provide helpful evidence to the other. This exception
to the strict adversarial model could, however, at least alleviate the
impact of the failures of strict adversary testing noted above. In
Part II, I examine whether it does presently or can realistically be
hoped to perform that function.
III. The Failure of the American Prosecutorial Model to
Compensate for the Absence of Full Adversarial Testing
A. The Awesome Power ofAmerican Prosecutors to
Effectively Decide Many Cases and the Inherent
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, supra note 48, at R. 3.8(d).
50 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13, supra note 48; see also
Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 46 (1991) (describing the responsibility
as "doing justice").
51 See Jessa Desimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public
Defender Act, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1488 (2006).
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Impediments in Current Institutional Design to Act as
Neutral Judges of the Facts Consistent with their De
Facto Role
The recognized duty of the prosecutor in the American system
"to do justice" has long been recognized as a key theoretical check
to protect the innocent from potential systemic failures of the
adversarial system. It may logically be advanced as a partial
remedy to the particular systemic failures occasioned by
inadequate defense funding and limited criminal discovery. I do
not gainsay the importance of this responsibility to American
criminal justice. In my judgment, this widely recognized
responsibility is in fact a key to the overall operation of American
justice, and it is significant in its impact. Unfortunately, as
developed later in this Part, the duty is not the equivalent of
effective testing by an effective adversary or a substitute for a
truly independent judgment on the merits.
The relevant enforceable element of the Rule of Professional
Conduct is the extremely limited requirement that "[t]he
prosecutor in a criminal case [shall] . . . refrain from prosecuting a
charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause."5 2 This standard requires only that the prosecution must be
supported by probable cause of the defendant's guilt, which
imposes an extremely light burden of justification on the
prosecutor." Second, it requires that the prosecutor refrain from
prosecuting only when the prosecutor knows that probable cause is
lacking.54 Finally, it imposes no duty of thorough inquiry into the
facts and no responsibility of independent investigation. "
Occasionally, the alternative standard of "sufficient evidence to
52 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (1983). The vast majority of
American jurisdictions use this standard. See Mosteller, supra note 38, at 1367. Only
the District of Columbia has a different standard. It requires that the prosecutor is not to
"[fjile in court or maintain a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause." D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2007). More significantly,
in the District of Columbia, the prosecutor is not to "[p]rosecute to trial a charge that the
prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie
showing of guilt." Id. at R. 3.8(c). However, even this variation can barely be called a
significant difference.
53 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 52, at R. 3.8(a).
54 Id.
55 Id.
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* 56
support a conviction" is proposed.
The commentators who argue for a more vigorous protection
of potentially innocent defendants do not generally advocate
substituting an objective standard or modifying the knowledge
requirement of the rule. Instead, in an apparent effort to set the
aspirational duty at a high level-to emphasize the personal
responsibility of the prosecutor-suggestions typically state the
prosecutor's duty in subjective terms and emphasize the necessity
of the prosecutor to reach a personal, moral judgment that the
defendant is guilty. Two formulations are offered. The less
demanding formulation is that for the prosecution to proceed, the
prosecutor should be "personally convinced of the defendant's
guilt."5 7 The more demanding standard would require that the
prosecutor be "morally certain that the defendant is guilty and that
criminal punishment is appropriate."" The key ingredient of both
formulations is not only to move beyond a forgiving objective
standard but also to require some type of moral judgment by the
prosecutor.5 9 My sense is that, while there may be some difference
in the effect of the two standards, the difference is not substantial,
and the key is that a responsible prosecutor is directed to make a
56 The United States Attorneys' Manual effectively adopts the first of the two
alternative standards set out above. It mandates that a federal prosecutor should
commence or recommend prosecution only "if he/she believes that the person's conduct
constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence will probably be sufficient
to obtain and sustain a conviction." See U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220(A)
(2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foiareadingroom/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm#9-
27.220.
The reason a trial-related burden is used in making the charging decision is
explained by the comment to this section, which is captioned "Grounds for Commencing
or Declining Prosecution." The comment explains that, "both as a matter of fundamental
fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, no prosecution
should be initiated against any person unless the government believes that the person
probably will be found guilty by an unbiased trier of fact." Id. § 9-27.220(B) cmt. The
U.S. Attorneys' Manual is an important internal directive by the preeminent prosecutor's
office in the United States.
57 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
309, 338 (2001) (describing the standards suggested for the prosecutor's "duty to
prejudge truth").
58 Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Charging Discretion, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 513, 524 (1993).
59 See id; Gershman, supra note 57, at 338.
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personal judgment regarding the defendant's guilt.
A third non-objective formulation, which on its face requires
the least of the prosecutor, introduces the important procedural
requirement of mandating a commitment to a neutral evaluation.
The late Professor Richard Uviller argued that the prosecutor can
prosecute a case without a personal belief in the defendant's guilt
if the evidence would permit a jury to fairly find either way,
letting a jury decide guilt or innocence."o However, though his
aspirational standard is the least demanding, he requires an
additional component describing the necessary perspective in the
charging decision as the "mindset of the true skeptic, the
inquisitive neutral."6 1 One deficiency of Uviller's proposal is that
without a duty of independent evaluation, which will include a
systematic re-examination of the facts and often independent
investigation of them, avoiding prosecution of the innocent is
impractical and likely impossible. Unfortunately, the American
system of prosecution, as it is presently structured, prevents the
effective exercise of such processes.
All of the standards require enhanced review of cases by the
prosecutor, which would provide benefits. A moral judgment by
the prosecutor that the defendant is guilty is an important
protection, but to provide significant protection to the innocent, it
must be supplemented by careful factual analysis. However, as
discussed in the next subsection, the utility of such factual analysis
is undercut when performed by the individual who serves as the
advocate for the prosecution.
60 See H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical
Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1159 (1973). However, if
"from all he knows of the case, [the prosecutor] believes that there is a substantial
likelihood that the defendant is innocent of the charge, he should, of course, not
prosecute." Id.
61 H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation ofDispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1695, 1704 (2000). Although his definition of
its scope is inadequate, Uviller would also require some limited measure of independent
investigation of the facts. He argues that the "alert prosecutor" will not automatically
process what the police officer presents as ready for bringing charges. "At the very least,
the complainant should be interviewed first hand." Id. at 1703.
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B. The Impediments to Prosecutors to Playing the Role of
Neutral Evaluators of the Merits of a Criminal Case
Professor Rachel Barkow has written a very insightful article
that provides a broad theoretical critique of the American justice
system as practiced in federal criminal cases and particularly the
failures in the design of the prosecutor's office. In Institutional
Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law,62 Barkow develops how the prosecutor has
come to exercise awesome powers in the federal criminal justice
system. In a system where only one in twenty cases goes to trial,
prosecutors are not only law enforcers, but also the de facto final
adjudicators of nearly all cases.63
The prosecutor's power, which has historically been
substantial, has been intensified by a series of legal developments
that have magnified it under the expanding reach of federal
criminal law. For example, the prosecutor controls the charging
decision and, given the overlapping nature of many federal
criminal statutes, often has available the choice of charges
carrying a range of sentences, including mandatory minimum
sentences for some of the crimes.64
The overall result is that for most defendants in the federal
criminal justice system, going to trial is too risky, and the
prosecutor therefore controls the terms of the resolution of the case
through the guilty plea offered and "accepted" by the defendant.66
In the process, the federal prosecutor has effectively become not
only the responsible law enforcement officer, but also the chief
62 See Barkow, supra note 34. As Barkow acknowledges, her insights benefit from
and share the core ideas of scholarship held by Judge and Professor Gerard Lynch. See
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv.
2117 (1998).
63 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 871.
64 See id. at 876-77; see generally Stuntz, supra note 46 (describing how
legislative and prosecutorial interests have constantly pushed an expansion of federal
criminal law jurisdiction that makes convictions easier to achieve and punishments
potentially harsher and thereby expands the effective power of the federal prosecutor).
65 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 879-80 (referencing the practical implications of
the Supreme Court's decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), which
held that "the Constitution does not prohibit prosecutors from threatening defendants
with more serious charges if they exercise their trial rights.").
66 See id at 877-82.
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adjudicator of the facts and frequently the resulting punishment.6 7
Barkow recognizes that combining investigative and adjudicative
power in criminal law in one actor is troubling for a number of
reasons. Among these is an intuitive difficulty inherent in
allowing the actor who participates in the investigation and
decides to pursue charges to be the same actor who impartially
judges those facts.
Her proposed solution is, having recognized that the
investigative and adjudicative roles have been combined, to apply
the principles of administrative law, which have been developed to
manage administrative agencies that explicitly combine
investigative and adjudicatory functions. The principal protection
is an explicit and clear separation of the two functions by
assigning them to different groups of employees within the
agency.6 9
With regard to the tasks entrusted to each group within the
prosecutor's office, Barkow proposes to treat as adjudicative the
decisions to charge, to offer or accept a plea deal, and to recognize
that the defendant provided substantial assistance.70 She considers
the decision to file a notice of substantial assistance difficult to
categorize as investigative or adjudicative but ultimately decides it
is adjudicative. She balances this decision somewhat by treating
as investigative the related decision on whether to enlist a
defendant as a cooperator in the first place.72 Under her division
of responsibility,
67 See id. at 871, 882-83, 887.
68 See id. at 883. Barkow identifies a number of reasons for this difficulty. One is
the difficulty of admitting that effort invested in developing the case was wasted.
Another is the self-interest in advancing within the office by pointing to a high success
rate. She also notes that when the same actor makes both decisions it creates greater
opportunity for biases and prejudices to dictate ultimate outcomes. Id.
69 See id. at 888-89. An additional protection used in administrative law is some
external review of agency decisions. Id. at 893-95. Barkow does not propose
prosecutorial reforms that are analogous to outside review used in administrative law,
concluding that, while it might be theoretically sound, she believes it is impractical. Id.
at 907-09. She rejects other suggested remedies, such as limiting the prosecutor's
discretion as to plea bargain and charging, for the same reason. Id. at 909-13.
70 See id. at 898-900.
71 See id. at 899.
72 Barkow, supra note 34, at 899.
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[n]either the Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) responsible
for investigating or overseeing the investigation of a case
or for representing the United States in court (either at trial
or in pretrial proceedings) nor any individual who has
directly supervised the AUSA in the investigation or
courtroom decisions should be the same individual who
makes the final determination of what charges to bring,
what plea to accept, or whether an individual has
cooperated sufficiently to merit a lesser sentence on the
basis of giving substantial assistance to the government.
Rather, a different prosecutor or panel of prosecutors who
were not involved in the investigation (as either a line
attorney or a supervisor) should make these adjudicative
decisions.7 3
Although Barkow believes that a panel of prosecutors
representing. a broad range of viewpoints is preferable to a single
individual making adjudicatory decisions, she recognizes and
accepts that resource constraints in smaller offices could dictate
the use of a single attorney.74
In an earlier article, I examined the failure of the North
Carolina criminal justice system to provide justice to Lee Wayne
Hunt.7 ' He is serving a life sentence in prison after a wrongful
conviction based exclusively on the testimony of informants who
received substantial benefits for their incriminating testimony.76
The targeted reform I recommended, for cases that rely critically
on informant testimony, is based on the same basic concept that
Barkow develops for the federal system generally. I argued that
the merits of the prosecution should be reviewed, both before trial
and upon post-conviction challenge, by a group of prosecutors
who are at least independent of the investigating prosecutor and
preferably independent of the office that handled the prosecution.7 7
I termed this a "fresh look" at the evidence by prosecutors who
had not committed themselves through their prior actions to the
73 Id. at 901.
74 See id.
75 See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent who
are not Innocents: Producing "First Drafts, " Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh
Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 528-48. (2009).
76 See id.
77 See id. at 573-77.
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merits of the prosecution.
Barkow's broader proposal and my more targeted and limited
approach each proceed from the same basic judgment that a
prosecutor who has actual responsibility for prior decisions in a
case as well as the potential responsibility for its prosecution will
find it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a reasonably fair
evaluation of the evidence." While I do not object at all to
Barkow's proposal, I did not adopt it generally for a number of
reasons. 8 She contends that her proposed reform would be
realistic in even the smallest U.S. Attorney's Office, which has
eleven Assistant United States Attorneys,8 ' and that it is politically
78 See id. at 573-74.
79 See id. at 573.
80 1 put great emphasis in my proposals regarding reforms applicable to informants
generally on practicality. See id. at 563 (noting the difficulty has not been with
developing sound and innovative proposals but with making them manageable and
implementing them). I also chose to focus on the review of charging decisions and
investigation when challenged after conviction in particular. See id. at 574 (recognizing
that selecting review committee members from the ranks of seasoned prosecutors may
bias the decision in favor of supporting the prosecution but going outside trusted ranks
would mean review would be unlikely). Barkow similarly worries that using prosecutors
who sometimes perform the task of investigator or advocate may bias the decision
despite their separation from such decisions in the case under review. See Barkow,
supra note 34, at 902.
Obviously, the greater the independence and the more definite the separation
from the prosecution, the more independent and neutral the evaluation is likely to be. A
recent example implementing the proposed model involved the independent review of
the investigation conducted and charges brought by the Durham County District
Attorney's Office in the Duke Lacrosse case by members of the North Carolina Attorney
General's Office. That independent review resulted in a dismissal of the charges and the
declaration that the defendants were innocent, coupled with a condemnation of District
Attorney Mike Nifong's actions. See Mosteller, supra note 38, at 1337-38 (describing
news conference statement by North Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper). By
contrast, the same veteran prosecutor from the Attorney General's Office who helped to
exonerate the lacrosse players chose to re-prosecute Alan Gell, another North Carolina
case, whose innocence was strongly suggested. In Gell's case, however, special
prosecutors from the Attorney General's Office had conducted the initial flawed
prosecution. See Mosteller, supra note 39, at 265, n.31 & 266, n.34. Whether the lack
of separation in the Gell case between the office responsible for the original prosecution
and the outcome of the review decision, despite the fact that the original prosecutors had
by the time of the re-prosecution left the office, cannot be known, but it is the type of
factor that.might well have influenced the decision. Id. at 266.
81 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 901.
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viable within the federal system.8 2 I hope she is correct on its
political viability, but I have my doubts that it will be generally
accepted. Moreover, in the state justice systems, which are of
greater concern to me than to Barkow, the model would not be
practical in many offices and political acceptability is less clear
given the lack of centralized structure in most states, which entrust
prosecutions to largely independent, elected local prosecutors.
However, my questions and any minor disagreements I have
with Barkow on the shape of reform are beside the point to her
central critique of the American adversary system, which is both
powerful in its implications and clearly accurate. I believe there
may be significant differences between the United States
Attorney's Offices, the United States Department of Justice, and
federal criminal law on the one hand, and state prosecutor
operations with differing state legislation and resources on the
other hand. Despite these important differences, there is great
commonality throughout American criminal justice operations
regarding the enormous power of prosecutors to secure guilty
pleas and the infrequent nature of trials because of the threat of
enhanced punishment upon conviction. On these broad features,
the federal and state systems are fundamentally equivalent.
Prosecutors are presently the chief adjudicators of the guilt and
punishment of defendants regardless of where the case arises.
And in every system, the person in charge of the prosecution
cannot reasonably be expected to adjudicate the defendant's case
fairly as well.
The American adversarial model is seriously flawed in its
failure to provide an adequate adversarial testing and adjudication
in the vast majority of cases. This is the consequence of the
failure to provide a true adversarial system, and the prosecutor's
mandate to ensure that justice is done cannot compensate for that
failure. Moreover, the effective addition of adjudicatory
responsibilities to the investigative and prosecutorial functions
makes the inherent adversarial perspective even more damaging. I
now turn to documentation about the psychological roots of the
adversarial perspective.
82 See id. at 913-21 (noting that similar practices are currently used in a number of
the larger offices).
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C. The Depth and Nature of the Impediment to Accurate
Neutral Evaluation by the Person Entrusted with the
Duties ofInvestigating and Prosecuting a Criminal Case
A fascinating article by the Professor Barbara O'Brien, A
Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial
Decision Making, " adds great insight on why the recognized
problem that prosecutors are not and cannot be expected to be fair
adjudicators has such strength and persistence. O'Brien adds
lessons from social psychological research generally and from her
own empirical findings to the legal commentary about this
problem.
Her beginning point is a set of cognitive biases, which are
defined as ways in which humans systematically and predictably
diverge from perfect rationality in their decision-making and
judgments. 84 The core concept at issue with prosecutors is
"confirmation bias," which is the "inappropriate bolstering of
hypotheses or beliefs whose truth is in question."" One way this
problem arises is through the "primacy effect," which occurs when
someone "forms an early opinion and subsequently evaluates new
information received in ways supporting the original opinion." 86
O'Brien also observes that prosecutors have motivations of
varying intensities at different stages of a prosecution." Once the
prosecutor has decided to proceed with a prosecution, the constant
motivation not to convict an innocent person is ordinarily
swamped by the motivation not to fail in the prosecution, which
would likely be viewed negatively by superiors conducting job
evaluations.88 A dismissal or acquittal, even if appropriate because
the defendant is judged innocent, theoretically undercuts the goal
of deterring other criminals since the decision will likely be
83 Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay
Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 74 Mo. L. REv. 999 (2009).
84 Id. at 1011.
85 Id. (quoting Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. OF GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
86 O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1011.
87 See id. at 1013.
88 See id.
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perceived by the public as a prosecutorial failure. 9 Moreover, the
dismissal is not always linked to the successful prosecution of
another individual, and it may not result in eventually solving the
crime and holding someone responsible.90
The prosecutor also faces "cognitive dissonance" as a
psychological deterrent to even entertaining doubts about the guilt,
typically a necessary first step to an effective reevaluation. 91 As
the prosecutor encounters a piece of evidence that might be
viewed as exculpatory, no conflict between belief and continued
prosecution is created if the evidence is considered or explained
away as consistent with guilt, but if it is actually believed as
possibly contrary to guilt, then the inconsistent continued
prosecution becomes uncomfortable. 92
O'Brien's central insight adds depth in the form of a
psychological foundation for the difficulty that a prosecutor faces
in neutrally evaluating the case. 93 The basic psychological
89 See id. at 1010.
90 See id. at 1013.
91 See id. at 1014.
92 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1014-15.
93 See id. No doubt, if further examined, other psychological mechanisms may
explain the power and the depth of the difficulty humans have with evaluating fairly new
information and altering the positions held before that new information was received.
See Monica Prasad, "There Must Be a Reason": Osama, Saddam, and Inferred
Justification, 79 SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY 142 (2009). Professor Prasad and her
colleagues noted that when asked about the connection between the invasion of Iraq and
the 9/11 terrorists, which data presented indicated did not exist, most respondents who
held the position that there was a connection engaged in one of three types of long-
identified strategies to resist persuasion by the new information- "counterarguing
(direct refutation), attitude bolstering (supporting one's position by other facts rather
than directly confronting the new data), selective exposure (ignoring the contradictory
data rather than directly refuting it or offering further support for the initial position with
different data)." Id. at 152-55 (citing a study by Julia Jacks and Kimberly Cameron,
Strategies for Resisting Persuasion, 25 BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 145,
145-161 (2003)). To those, her research findings indicate that two others were
articulated: "disputing rationality (maintaining that positions do not have to be entirely
rationally grounded in facts or reasoning), and most interestingly, inferred justification
(inferring evidence that would support the initial position under the logic that it must
exist because the position is sound)," Prasad at 152, 155-57.
Prasad explains that "[i]nferred justification operates as a backward chain of
reasoning that justifies the favored opinion by assuming the causal evidence that would
support it." Id. at 155. She concludes that the implications from their research may be
that misinformation about a connection between the 9/11 terrorists and Iraq did not lead
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phenomenon is a form of confirmation bias-defensive bolstering
that occurs due to the nature of the prosecutor's ultimate task, if
the case proceeds to trial, of presenting an effective advocate's
case to the finder of fact.9 4 General psychological research has
shown that the willingness to acknowledge weaknesses in a
position is diminished for those who are rewarded for their ability
to persuade others of their position. " This unconscious
psychological tendency impedes their efforts to evaluate the
evidence supporting the position in an even-handed fashion.9 6
Moreover, defensive bolstering can undermine a basic
counterbalance to error provided by the threat of accountability for
an erroneous decision. Unfortunately, when accountability for
error comes after the information has been received and a decision
reached, balanced and thorough reasoning does not follow, and the
psychological response is defensive bolstering.9 7
O'Brien adds her own experimental research to the recognized
general psychological impediments to neutral evaluation by a
prosecutor.9 8 She designed one of the tasks to track the basic task
of a prosecutor in what is known as a vertical system of
prosecution. A vertical system of prosecution is a system in which
prosecutors initially evaluate the case to determine whether the
defendant should be charged and then have the responsibility of
presenting the case to a judge or jury if it goes to trial.9 9
to support for the Iraq war but the other way around in that support for the war led to
misperception of the facts. Moreover, such reasoning "may be strongest when stakes are
the highest." Id. at 159.
The inferred justification mechanism has rather obvious potential application to
why investigators and/or prosecutors may continue to maintain the position that a suspect
is guilty and ignore or disregard contrary new evidence. It and the other psychological
mechanisms identified provide explanations and have implications regarding the
prospects for disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). It is possible that the prosecutor may never perceive
some evidence as exculpatory, or he or she may unconsciously withhold that evidence
due to his or her deeply held position.
94 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1004.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1028.
97 See id. at 1019.
98 See id. at 1027, 1028.
99 In two studies O'Brien randomly assigned students to one of several conditions.
See id. at 1027, 1028. The design of both studies required the students-who had
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O'Brien finds confirmation of a fascinating, expected
conclusion. 00 In answering a set of questions about the file, test
subjects who had been told that their ultimate task was to persuade
remembered as true more facts consistent with guilt and fewer
different purported purposes-to read a case file and answer questions regarding it
before they reached the point of performing their assigned task. See id. at 1027-28. The
subjects in the first study were given instructions that defined the ultimate task as
focused on persuasion, process, or outcome. See id. at 1027.
In the persuasive condition, the task, which is most related to that of the
prosecutor, instructed participants that their assignment would be to give a persuasive
presentation on the file. Id. at 1027. In this condition, study subjects were instructed:
This study has two parts; you are participating in part 1. Your job is to figure
out what happened and to formulate a brief argument (about 5 minutes) that
would persuade a jury of your position. To do this, as you review the evidence,
think about the argument you will present to me in a tape-recorded interview.
This tape will later be played to the participants in the second part of the study
and rated for how persuasive it is. Id.
In the "process" condition, the study instructed participants that their ultimate
task was to respond by evaluating the file and explaining at the end the reasoning process
and strategies they used in reaching their conclusion. Id. These subjects were instructed:
As you know, the case materials you are about to read are from a real case. At
the time of the investigation, the police department was especially concerned
about the accuracy of its investigations; that is, were its detectives using the
investigatory techniques best suited for finding the truth? The department
therefore brought in a consultant to advise them about the correct procedures to
maximize the detectives' chances to get at the truth and to review the
detectives' work. This consultant is the best in his field and has advised some
of the biggest departments in the country, including the FBI. We are interested
in how well your investigatory decisions match the procedures he advocates.
We're not so much concerned about the outcomes of your strategies but in the
information you considered in formulating those strategies in reaching your
conclusion. Therefore, at the end of the experiment, we will briefly interview
each of you about your responses and judgments. Id. at 1027-28.
A third group, which was focused on the best outcome, was instructed:
We are interested in whether you figure out who did this crime and how exactly
it happened. As you know, the case materials you are about to read are from a
real case. This case has already been to trial and considered by a judge and
jury. To measure how accurate you are, we will compare your judgments about
what happened to the conclusions reached by the judge and jury. To do this, we
will briefly interview each of you at the end of the experiment and conduct
further analysis on your tape-recorded responses to see whether you succeeded
in figuring out what happened. Id.
Those in the control condition were simply told to read the file and answer questions
without any particular objective being noted. Id. at 1027.
100 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1028, 1031.
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facts consistent with innocence, as compared with the control
groups. o'0 They also interpreted ambiguous or inconsistent
information more consistent with the suspect's guilt.102
O'Brien's work-an exploration of general psychological
motivations that negatively influence the ability of prosecutors to
act neutrally when evaluating cases where they are charged with
the responsibility of serving as advocates-provides strong
support for forms like those advocated by Barkow (and me).
O'Brien's work develops further arguments for why such
separation of responsibilities is not only justified as a matter of
legal scholarship, but also as a matter of documented human
psychology that is often outside conscious control.
D. Proposed Reform
As noted earlier, Professor Barkow is accurate in her overall
assessment of the transformation of the American criminal
adjudication process to one where the prosecutor frequently acts as
both chief advocate and final adjudicator, whether the focus is
federal or state prosecutions. While there may be various
formulations of a key remedy, the central feature of reform should
be clear and practical because it should be done within either the
prosecutor's office or within a community of prosecutors. The
central feature is that a review should be conducted of all cases-
or, in the alternative, of identified classes of problematic cases-
by individuals who do not have the responsibility to prosecute the
case.
Whether this form of the remedy will prove adequate is
subject to debate, but whether nor not prosecutors' offices should
attempt to implement it in some form should not be. Barkow
specifically notes that some of the larger United States Attorney's
Offices already operate in a design that is helpful in separating
functions by assigning the charging decision to a separate, sizeable
group of attorneys who are independent from those attorneys who
would be given the task of presenting the case to a jury if the case
were to proceed.103
101 See id. at 1031, 1049-50, n.201.
102 See id. at 1029.
103 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 915-17 (giving examples of United States
Attorneys' offices that prosecute crimes independent of authorities that make charges).
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IV. Suggested Implications for the Comparison between the
Adversarial Model and the Inquisitorial Model in
Professor O'Brien's Research
Professor O'Brien did not examine the implications of her
research for different systems of justice on an international level;
she focused on the American adversarial system. However,
concerns about institutional design for, and the role definition of,
those who investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes-and the
impact of that design on effectiveness and accuracy-have
implications for both differences within national systems and
across international systems for comparative law purposes.
O'Brien focuses on the person with the ultimate task
assignment and on the psychological impact that the task has on
that person's perception and memory of the facts unearthed. Her
insights relate quite directly to the accuracy of the investigative
result. This basic instinct animates my suggestion in The Special
Threat of Informants to the Innocent"o' of a "fresh look" at the
evidence before trial by largely independent reviewers in cases
that critically depend on informant testimony, a recognized
suspect category of evidence in American prosecutions.o More
generally, Barkow employs insights from administrative law to
suggest reform of the institutional design of federal prosecutors'
offices based on the structure and separation of different types of
functions in administrative agencies.106 She applies these lessons
and recommends the separation of functions between those that
are essentially prosecutorial and those that are fundamentally
adjudicative, such as evaluating the evidence gathered to make a
charging decision.07 O'Brien's research buttresses the instincts
that animate these reforms and sharpens their focus. Given the
renewed focus on accuracy with specific emphasis on innocence in
the American criminal justice system, her research has special
104 Mosteller, supra note 75 (employing shortened title).
105 See id. at 573-74 (arguing that, when informant testimony provides the only
direct evidence of guilt, an examination of the evidence supporting guilt be conducted by
prosecutors who have no direct involvement in the current prosecution). I also argue that
where substantial evidence has been discovered after conviction, independent review
should be required. See id. at 574-76.
106 See Barkow, supra note 34, at 895-906.
107 Id.
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salience. It also clearly has important implications for the general
question of the comparative advantages of the adversarial and
inquisitorial systems.'o
Certainly, other researchers, including noted comparative
scholar Professor Mirjan Damagka, have recognized the potential
connection between accuracy in the criminal process and the
psychological impacts of an adversarial approach to fact
investigation. 109 Indeed, Damaika observed the adversarial
system's potential to bias the development of the facts in an
unconscious way in an article he published over thirty years ago,
albeit suggesting a different type of bias.1 o He also recognized the
potential significance of emerging social psychology and
empirical research insights with respect to comparative law and its
lessons for institutional design improvement."'
The adversarial and inquisitorial methods of procedure affect
various elements of the process-the investigatory stage, the
charging decision, and the trial-and each of these can be
examined. Often the focus of academic analysis is at the end of
the process-the trial-with emphasis on two areas: the
implications of different types of decision-makers and roles for
10 The issue that I identify here-the theoretical superiority of the inquisitorial
judge in the investigation process because of a neutral orientation to conviction-may be
seen as either a very significant issue or a minor one. The reason it would be considered
significant or even fundamental is that, if the neutral perspective of the investigator
inherently biases the fairness of the process that cannot be corrected by the adversarial
mindset of the American prosecutor, then the other strengths of the adversarial model
cannot necessarily compensate. On the other hand, it may be minor for several reasons.
One is that there are many potential advantages of the inquisitorial model that would
seem more important at a superficial level (although because not operating at an
unconscious level they may perhaps not be as impervious to correction). Another is that
the inquisitorial investigative judge is being marginalized and subject to calls for
abolition in the national systems where it currently exists. See J&6me de Hemptinne,
The Creation ofInvestigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court: An Option
Worth Pursuing?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 402, 403 (2007) (arguing, despite the
questioning of the use of the inquisitorial investigative judge in national systems, that it
has important advantages if properly structured for the International Criminal Court).
109 See generally Mirjan Damaika, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding
Precision, 123 PA. L. REv. 1083 (1975) [hereinafter Presentation of Evidence]
(explaining how the psychological tendencies of both witnesses and decision makers
contribute to fact finding).
110 Id.
Ill Id.
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evidentiary barriers erected, 112 and the variations in how the
evidence is presented. In Presentation of Evidence and
Factfinding Precision, ' Damaika concentrates mostly, with
regard to the inquisitorial system, on the interaction between the
active role at trial of inquisitorial trial judges in developing the
evidence, and the direct involvement of the judge in presenting it,
which is the necessary concomitant of that active judicial role.'14
This means that before the inquisitorial judge has reached a
decision in the cases, he or she has at least some involvement in
selecting the evidence to be used, which has an obvious potential
to bias his or her subsequent adjudicatory decision."'
Damaika develops a parallel treatment of the adversarial
system and its compensating disadvantage of bias operating in a
different direction.1 6 He notes that when advocates develop and
select the evidence for presentation at the trial, they elicit
testimony by narrowly focused questions that may distort the
testimony.1' However, this system keeps the factfinder, who is
passive, out of the process and, therefore, unbiased, which is not
possible for the active inquisitorial factfinder who must become
knowledgeable of the facts to present them."'
Damaika also explored some implications of social science
research-a field that was much less sophisticated then than it is
112 This aspect of the picture is Damaika's primary subject of inquiry in Evidentiary
Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study.
See Damaika, supra note 6.
113 Presentation ofEvidence, supra note 109.
114 Id.
I15 See id. at 1088-90. Although some theoretical versions of a pure inquisitorial
system might have a single inquisitorial judicial officer involved in charging,
investigating, prosecuting, and judging a case, no European country has such a system
and likely none in the contemporary world would ever invest these responsibilities in the
same person. While inquisitorial judges of some description are trial judges,
investigating judges, and prosecuting officers in typical inquisitorial systems, the same
person does not both investigate the case and serve as a decider of guilt. See E-mail
from Jacqueline Hodgson, supra note 35. However, as noted above, the judge who is a
decider of guilt, frequently has some role, albeit a much more limited role, in developing
facts for the trial, which role, even though limited, is in clear contrast to the complete
hands-off approach of adversarial judges regarding to active fact development.
116 See Presentation ofEvidence, supra note 109, at 1093-95.
117 Id.
118 Id.
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today-regarding the advantages of adversarial versus non-
adversarial presentations of evidence on the accuracy of the
decision rendered. "' Research suggested that with unbiased
judges, the presentational method had no effect, but with biased
judges, the non-adversarial presentation had a significantly higher
number of findings of guilt. 120 This research on its face supported
the superiority of the adversarial system.121 However, that was not
Damagka's view.
Damaika instead took a broader view than just the impact of
the type of presentation-adversarial or non-adversarial--on the
factfinder. 122 He noted that the two systems also had major
impacts in biasing the actual development of the evidence, 123
which he termed "more important costs" of the development of
evidence through the adversarial system.124 That is the "damage to
testimony inflicted by the preparation of witnesses," focusing on
"the damage of interrogation to memory images." 25 Distortions
resulting from inadequately prepared testimony could be greater
than the negative effects of adversarial witness interviewing and
preparations and could outweigh the advantages of inquisitorial
process in presenting evidence, or in the factfinder's neutrality, but
Damaika's insight remains invaluable. He obviously could not yet
have benefited from the research findings of the type that O'Brien
has developed. However, his instincts were sound in noting three
points: first, the impact that characteristics of the adversarial
model can have on the accuracy of fact gathering; second, the
more obvious impact that a judge actively presenting evidence at
trial has on that judge as a neutral factfinder; and third, the
I19 See generally, id. at 1095-1100 (describing and critiquing research findings by
Professors Thibaut, Walker, and Lind, infra note 120).
120 See id.; see also John Thibaut, Laurens Walker & E. Allan Lind, Adversary
Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REv. 386 (1972)
(suggesting that their experimental research lends credence to the claim that adversary
presentation can combat bias).
121 See Thibaut et al., supra note 120.
122 See Presentation ofEvidence, supra note 109, at 1093.
123 In this treatment, he refers to the "darker view of the cathedral" that "is seldom
illuminated." Id. He also refers to "important cognitive costs" of the adversarial system.
Id.
124 Id. at 1094.
125 Id,
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potential value added by augmenting innovative legal and systems
analysis with empirical social science research. Particularly in the
first element-the impact of system design on accuracy of
investigative efforts-the difference in assessment of facts
resulting from the more neutral perspective of the inquisitorial
judge, charged with supervising the investigation, 12 6 contrasted
with the adversary system, entrusting responsibility largely with
partisans and particularly with the partisan prosecutor, logically
should matter in outcomes.
While Professor Damagka was forced to speculate as to the
impact of adversarial motivation on the accuracy of fact
development, O'Brien's research not only directly tests that
impact, but also examined the utility of "accountability"
mechanisms to counteract such bias.'2 7 Rather than always being
useful in reducing bias, "the wrong kind of accountability can
amplify... [the bias]."l2 8
Professor O'Brien's research findings can be used to speculate
further on ways to improve the conduct and supervision of fact
development, in either the adversarial or the inquisitorial system to
improve accuracy. Moreover, Dan Simon and his colleagues have
explicitly made this conceptual connection and have begun
exploring the implications of unconscious psychological
mechanisms on fact investigations in adversarial and non-
adversarial conditions.129
As to whether the adversarial or inquisitorial model is superior
in factfinding, new empirical evidence supports the theoretical
superiority of inquisitorial side.' The undeniable implication of
126 In the French inquisitorial system, for example, two different judicial officers,
who are different from the trial judge, may be given the duty of supervising the
investigation, the juge d'instruction and/or the procureur. See generally infra notes 132,
146-167 (discussing the French inquisitorial system broadly).
127 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1018-23.
128 Id. at 1023.
129 See Simon et al, supra note 15 (exploring implications of investigations
conducted for the purpose of what psychologists term "diagnostic strategies" versus
"confirmation strategies" and to extend and confirm research involved in "coherence
based reasoning" and finding superiority of a non-adversarial design).
130 Professor Simon and his colleagues in other research have extended the
implications of their earlier research by demonstrating that the degree of adversarial bias
incorporated into the experimental design affects the degree of distortion of accuracy in
evaluation in predictable directions. See id.
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this new research is that a non-adversarial design of the basic task
of investigation, all other elements being controlled, produces
superior accuracy.13 ' The results strongly suggest that the type of
task assigned to American prosecutors, which is ultimately to
persuade, disadvantages them in coordinating the investigation and
evaluating the information and evidence developed when
compared to the situation where those tasks are assigned to the
inquisitorial judge who has no role in ultimately persuading the
factfinder of the accused's guilt.'3 2
I found the implications of O'Brien's research enlightening,
particularly in the contemporary American environment, with its
heightened commitment to avoid unjust convictions and thus to
further informational accuracy in the investigation process. As a
person steeped in the adversarial model as a former criminal
defense attorney who relished his role and the practice within the
adversary system, I found its implications suggesting the
superiority of the inquisitorial investigative model intriguing.
Clearly, the implications I have described support a design
advantage for the inquisitorial model. Thus, I do want to
acknowledge a clear mark on that the inquisitorial side of some
figurative scorer's card. However, the realistic question is, not the
superiority of either the inquisitorial or adversarial model in some
idealized form, but rather examination of how those systems
operate in concrete forms of national justice systems."' Also, the
131 As noted earlier, the adversarial system has some potential theoretical
advantages that could easily more than offset this subconscious theoretical advantage of
the inquisitorial system. See Uphoff, supra note 18, at 781 (describing the potential
advantage of the adversarial system to provide more, albeit potentially biased,
investigative information to the factfinder from two motivated advocates, which is a
potential advantage that the present American system squanders by woefully
underfunding those representing indigent defendants who compromise the vast majority
of those charged with crimes in state courts).
132 In the French inquisitorial system, the juge d'instruction has roughly this task
definition. He or she is a judicial officer who is charged with verifying the preliminary
investigation and further developing evidence and evaluating it. See HODGSON, supra
note 25, at 222-28 (discussing the role of the juge d'instruction). Then this judicial
officer, if the case is to be carried forward, leaves the case to others to present to yet
another judge who is charged with judging. See E-mail from Jacqueline Hodgson, supra
note 35 (clarifying the French system).
133 American scholars have long expressed skepticism about whether theoretical
procedural advantages afforded by the inquisitorial model, and specifically the role of
judicial officers in supervising investigations, actually produce superior results for the
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lessons learned are more likely useful to real-world reforms within
either a national inquisitorial or adversarial model than they are in
judging overall superiority of the basic models.
For example, if the advocate in the American model is an
Assistant United States Attorney who is skilled, independent, and
ethically sensitive, the differences in perspective produced by
institutional role definition of the prosecutor versus the
inquisitorial judge in evaluating a file for the charging decision or
developing evidence may be reduced, even though probably not
eliminated. Adjustments on the inquisitorial side reducing
neutrality, which will be examined below, may further narrow the
difference, although perhaps not again eliminate the benefit, all
other things being equal, of a more neutral definition of the
ultimate goal of the individual conducting the investigation of the
facts of the case.
O'Brien does not suggest that social psychologists treat all
incentives as having equal power. 1' She recognizes that
prosecutors often have conflicting motivations, and she attempts to
identify the likely motivations involved and the strength of the
incentives supporting various role-enforcing outcomes. 3 What
O'Brien's research does demonstrate is that role definition as an
advocate has an unconscious impact by itself on the fairness and
accuracy of observation and memory of the facts encountered
during the investigative process.'3 6 That is a powerful insight, and
should have important implications on institutional design for all
systems. However, when placed in actual national judicial
systems with the complications inherent in actors having shifting
roles and varied motivations flowing from personal goals and
institutional incentives, the overall impact of the role definition
may be muted or overcome. Even if the overall impact is
inquisitorial system in practice. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The
Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and
Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 281 (1977) (detailing many perceived failures in the theory
of judicial control to operate in actual practice and noting that "the myth of judicial
control persists and has a distorting effect").
134 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1010-12 (explaining the role of multiple goals and
biases that influence a prosecutor's actions).
135 Id. at 1012-14.
136 See id. at 1029 (explaining that study participants assigned to advocate were
more likely to conclude that ambiguous facts were consistent with their goal).
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diminished, the importance of the insight is not eliminated. It
likely affects degree of neutrality and therefore will be critical to
accuracy in some cases, and it should provide guidance for
adjustments in institutional structures to enhance fairness and
accuracy within any structure.
In Professor Jacqueline Hodgson's book, French Criminal
Justice,"' she carefully details the operation of the inquisitorial
systems in France in comparison to the adversarial system in
England and Wales. 138 Her treatment contains both theoretical
constructs and detailed institutional context, 3 9 which allows one to
go far beyond the informed intuition upon which scholarship must
often depend. Hodgson describes distinctions between these
inquisitorial and adversarial models at a number of conceptual and
practical levels.140 I will examine only a few of the most salient of
these.
At a conceptual level, Hodgson describes an accepted view of
the accused in the French system that proceeds from a
fundamental concept of the polity that is unfamiliar to the
contemporary American experience." In France, the accused "is
a fellow citizen who is seen to have failed in some way, to have let
down both herself and the community, and who now needs
assistance in the process of reintegration into society."' 4 2 This
view also contrasts with that in England and Wales where
defendants are not idealized and "are treated as an underclass
beyond redemption." 4 3
European inquisitorial systems generally and the French
137 HODGSON, supra note 25.
138 Id. at 1.
139 See id. at 4 (explaining the theoretical papers and studies the paper builds on by
studying the actors in the system).
140 See id. at 1 (listing several examples).
141 See id. at 20-21 (describing the view that the state is part of the general public).
142 Id. at 21. How much that view carries into practical difference in treatment of
actual suspects is, one would expect, perhaps a different matter as Hodgson demonstrates
in other elements of the French criminal justice system.
143 HODGSON, supra note 25, at 21. I would add to the description that it applies
equally in the United States, although I hope that at least many, although not all, defense
counsel in the United States do not share this view as Hodgson notes is the case in her
referenced jurisdictions. See generally id. ch. 4 (describing the role of the French
defense lawyer).
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system in particular define the judicial function differently than
the adversarial system and select, train, and organize the judicial
branch differently.1' Hodgson describes characteristics of French
inquisitorial judges that give context and meaning to the degree of
neutrality French judicial officers exhibit.145
In contrast to England and Wales, the French definition of the
judicial function is a broadly defined concept that encompasses
"the trial judge, the juge d'instruction, and the procureur."l46 The
trial judge function is not only to pass judgment, but also to
conduct further inquiries as needed to determine guilt or
innocence. 147 Necessarily the judge adopts a more active role than
in an adversarial system, the inquisitorial judge questioning
witnesses and the accused, and calling for additional information
from the parties beyond that provided when necessary.148 The juge
d'instruction is formally responsible for conducting the
instruction, which "represents the paradigm model of investigation
within French inquisitorial procedure." 14 The inquisitorial
tradition emphasizes obtaining an evaluation of all relevant
information during the pretrial setting rather than at a trial and by a
judge rather than by a prosecutor and defense counsel. 0 The
procureur, like the American or English prosecutor, decides
whether or not to seek to charge the accused with a crime after
reviewing the evidence. "' However, "[a]s a magistrat[e], she
plays a more neutral and wide ranging role than that of a simple
(more partisan) prosecutor: she is a judicial officer, responsible for
directing the police investigation and overseeing the detention of
suspects in police custody, including the protection of their due
process rights."' 52
144 See id. at 17-18 (describing that the French view the judiciary as the function of
the state, while the US and UK view it as independent).
145 Id. at 19-20.
146 Id. at 66.
147 Id. at 67.
148 Id.
149 HODGSON, supra note 2525, at 209. Hodgson notes that, "less than 5% of cases
are dealt with" through the instruction. Id.
150 Id. at 222 (noting that the parties are assigned a more active role than in earlier
times).
151 Id. at 75.
152 Id.
357
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Both procureurs and juges d'instruction are judicial officers
who direct investigations. "' However, procureurs are much
closer to the ordinary adversarial prosecutor, who supervises the
police in their investigation.15 4 The juge d'instruction is more in
line with the image of the classic inquisitorial investigative judge
who directs the investigation and develops and evaluates the
dossier. "' This judicial officer at least theoretically has an
appropriate degree of separation from the police, has a role
defined in neutral terms, and, once the assigned task is
accomplished, drops out of the case."' The role of presenting the
evidence at trial is left then to a prosecutor with the greater
involvement of the third judicial officer, the trial judge."' The
placing of the different functions in the hands of three different
individuals has the potential for enhancing neutrality in
perspective.
Unfortunately, as Hodgson develops in her study of the
French criminal justice system, other institutional, social, cultural,
and contextual factors undercut much of that theoretical
153 Id.
154 See id. at 74-75 (describing the roles of the prosecutor in the English system and
the role of the procureur.
155 See Michael E. Tigar et al., Paul Touvier and the Crime Against Humanity, 30
TEX. INT'L L.J. 285, 295 n.79 (1995) (describing the role of the juge d'instruction within
the judicial system).
156 Before more serious cases are charged officially and tried, another level of
judicial review is required. The dossier is sent to a Chambre d'instruction to be
reviewed by a panel of appellate judges before it is tried in the Cour d'assises. See
CATHERINE ELLIOTr, FRENCH CRIMINAL LAw 35, 44 (2001) (stating that at the end of the
investigation, thejuge d'instruction's order "states either that there is no case to answer"
because it would be inappropriate to proceed or sends the case to the Public Prosecutor
who asks the Chambre de I'instruction to review it, referring the case to trial in the Cour
d'assises if it finds sufficient evidence to support the charges and that the earlier
procedure was complete and lawful); Rende Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two
Systems: An American on Trial for Murder in the French Cour d'Assises, 2001 U. ILL.
L. REv. 791, 805-06 (describing review by a panel of judges in the Chambre
d'instruction before issuing formal charges of the dossier prepared by a juge
d'instruction who determined prosecution warranted for a serious crime); Tigar et al.,
supra note 155, at 295 n.79 (describing generally the operation of the French criminal
system).
157 See Lerner, supra note 156, at 805 (explaining that the procureur de la
Rpublique presents the case in court, which is approved first by the Chambre de
I'instruction).
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separation. As in many other European systems, France has a
career judiciary with competitive examinations and thereafter, for
those chosen, common training, high professional status, and
social recognition. Ultimately, the effect is a strong mutual
allegiance shared by those within "the corps," which she describes
as resembling a family's bond.159 Presumably a similar common
bond exists within the "judicial corps" of similarly selected
professional judiciaries throughout the European inquisitorial
tradition. Despite substantial similarities in these judicial
positions, she notes one important difference between France and
Germany in the membership of the corps. 160 In France the
professional judiciary includes not only trial and investigative
judges, but also public prosecutors, trial judges and public
prosecutors, while in Germany these jobs are institutionally
separated in significant ways. 161 This difference may be
significant and suggests that other details regarding organization
of the judiciary in the European inquisitorial systems may be
important in determining the neutrality of inquisitorial judges
involved in the investigative process.
She solidifies the importance of perceived membership in a
"corps" that includes partisans in the process with a particularly
telling quotation from ajuge d'instruction.162 This judge describes
the French judiciary as having
[t]he unity of a single corps[,] which includes the functions
of prosecution, of investigation and of judgment. We are
the same, we come out of the same school, we know each
other. That is the real problem ... I am often shocked by
the way in which people talk about certain cases before and
after the court hearing.. . . I once heard a judge say, 'but of
course we must defend the police.' . . . Even I question
myself: Do I work as a judge, investigator or partner of the
police and Gendarmerie? I do not know. 163
158 See HODGSON, supra note 25, at 69.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See id. & n.17 (describing briefly differences in the German system).
162 Id. at 69.
163 See id. at 70. The policing role in France is generally the responsibility of the
Gendarmerie and the police nationale. See id. at 86-87 (explaining the historical roles of
each institution).
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The juge d'instruction who made the statement appears both
extremely candid and insightful. While many American
prosecutors could make this judge's final comment in a slightly
different form, an American trial judge would not be likely to state
it publicly. Indeed, while unexceptional if made by a career
American prosecutor working in many state systems, it would be
an unlikely way for most Assistant United States Attorneys to
articulate their allegiances. My experience both in practice and as
a faculty member is that many, perhaps most, Assistant United
States Attorneys in large offices are not career prosecutors.
Instead, they are recent graduates of excellent law schools on their
way to lucrative jobs in the private sector after a few years both
leaming valuable trial skills that enhance their career and
providing what they correctly perceive as important public service.
As noted above, it is a statement that I believe few American trial
judges would ever state publicly, although similar statements may
well frequently be made in confidence, particularly by elected
American judges, and held as the unexpressed sentiments of many
others.'64
More generally, while the separation of the judicial role into
three separate components might lead to greater neutrality in the
classic role of the juge d'instruction, that is not necessarily the
result. Hodgson finds that as a result of dependence on the police
and the procureur, the juge d'instruction's perspective often
mirrors theirs. Consequently, the investigation is not searching or
164 There are many different types of officials who exercise judicial functions in the
United States. Those who routinely handle large numbers of warrant applications
presented to them by the police are no doubt likely to closely identify with the police and
would likely express precisely this sentiment.
Judge Marvin Frankel described a different allegiance that is frequently common
with American judges and that is to retain their identification with the partisan
background of their experience in practice. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE
39-40 (1980) ("[J]udges tend more than rarely to be, or to be perceived as being warmly
adversarial rather than coolly detached and disinterested. When this happens, it is
supposedly a deviation from the strict idea. Yet it is a direct, visible consequence of our
adversary process."). Such an identification is similar to that described by the French
judge but would be much more related to the prosecutor, which is the likely career
connection in most jurisdictions, than with the police, although the basic identification
with the "government's side" is quite similar. The feature common throughout this
discussion is that social and professional connections may matter as much or more than
theoretical constructs, but an important enduring message from the empirical research is
that theoretical constructs can have an important impact on their own.
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vigorous and may be more of an operation to verify the initial
conclusions of the police and the fellow judicial officer, the
procureur, who referred the case to the instruction. 6 1
Throughout her treatment of the French system, Hodgson
notes the complicated impact of reformulation of roles. For
example, efforts to separate the investigative function from the
judicial functions of the juge d'instruction has led to the transfer
of power from such judges to procureurs, the latter group handling
more serious cases while exercising less direct supervision of the
police and thereby reducing the protection provided to the
accused.'66  This is one of many complicated interactions within
the French justice system that affects the actual impact of changes
in the assignment of tasks to various actors and proceedings. 6 1
I believe the central lesson from this examination of
165 See id. at 210 (observing the measures that procureur can use to guide the
investigation, and that only the procureur, and not the juge d'instruction, can refer a case
for investigation).
Hodgson suspects that identification with the police and with the fellow judge
who previously evaluated case results in biasing the judicial officer who adjudicates guilt
or innocence in favor of the prosecution. She notes that conviction rates are very high in
the Cour d'assises, where cases are tried that have been handled in the instruction and
the dossier developed and evaluated by the juge d'instruction, which could mean that the
pre-judgment of the juge d'instruction continues to influence the adjudication, or might
mean that only strong cases get through the instruction process. See E-mail from
Jacqueline Hodgson, supra note 35.
166 See HODGSON, supra note 25, at 71 & n.30 (detailing the reforms that took place
in 2000 and in 2004 that reduced the power of the juge d'instruction). Id. at 123
(explaining that the procedures in place outside of the instruction are more hostile and
favored by procureur).
167 Hodgson notes that the defense function has generally been strengthened across
French criminal procedure. In pre-trial investigation proceedings, that role is much more
limited outside the instruction. Id. at 121. However, pre-trial defense rights are more
limited in the French system because of the belief in the inquisitorial ideal and,
moreover, even though the instruction allows for greater defense participation, defense
counsel have not yet taken advantage of the opportunities given. See E-mail from
Jacueline Hodgson to the author, supra note 35; HODGSON, supra note 25, at 249 (noting
that gaining greater involvement of the defense will take "more than legislative reform to
alter the occupational cultures of lawyers and magistrats" and that even if the defense
role is enhanced in the instruction, the vast majority of cases are supervised by the
procureur with virtually no opportunity for defense participation). See also Uphoff,
supra note 18, at 781 (discussing the failure of the American adversarial system to take
advantage of an important potential advantage to provide more information through
adversarial development of evidence helpful to the defense because of chronic
underfunding of the defense function).
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comparative scholarship generally and specifically from social
science research and institutional design literature should go
toward improving processes by adjustments within each system.
In order to be effective, these reforms should be sensitive to
unconscious effects of structures upon fairness and accuracy. The
usable lessons will direct us in altering those structures in
politically realistic ways that can be accomplished efficiently.'
These insights indicate a theoretical advantage in the basic
design of the more neutral inquisitorial method of fact
investigation as opposed to the partisan design of the adversarial
systems, which with a chronically and significantly underfunded
defense effectively puts investigative control in the hands of the
prosecutor. Placed in context, these insights let us evaluate how to
define tasks and roles, and help shape loyalties and incentives in
ways that recognize where actual rather than theoretical loyalties
may lie. This is not to reduce the significance of the new
knowledge. Rather, it is to understand that in designing the role of
investigator, the simple knowledge that the investigator will be
expected to present his or her conclusions in a way that goes into a
winning prosecution will distort accuracy. Also, those who
manage criminal investigators should communicate that
advancement and rewards depend on the investigator's ability, and
the ability of those given the file prepared by the investigator, to
judge the case accurately. Direct indications that the file will be
scrutinized with regard to the fairness of the process might also
enhance fairness.
These simple differences in job definition and the resulting
alteration in unconscious perspective may matter critically
according to O'Brien's recitation of accepted psychological
168 A specific lesson of the new research by O'Brien and others, beyond the
theoretical structural advantage, it suggests the inquisitorial task design has over the
adversarial model, concerns the organization of the judicial "corps." For France and
other European inquisitorial systems using similar systems, the limitations on
membership in the judicial "corps" used in Germany might be examined for its potential
superiority in achieving investigative and adjudicatory fairness in ways not previously
understood. However, there are likely offsetting theoretical concerns, matters of
practicality, and questions whether such a modification, if made, would likely have any
appreciable effect given the social and institutional features of the system that would
remain unchanged.
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learning and her experimental findings.16 9 All other things being
equal, altering the investigator's perspective would tip the balance
and give them sufficient neutrality to improve the process. In the
end, whether the resulting investigation will produce significantly
more accurate results is impossible to know; certainly errors
would continue to occur even if the reforms suggested by this
research are implemented because investigators are obviously
limited and imperfect human agents. However, the process should
be characterized by greater procedural fairness, and fairness is one
of the few universal values of criminal investigation and
adjudication in all systems. Moreover, as distinct from accuracy,
such procedural fairness is an attribute that systems can aspire to
achieve because it is theoretically within their control through
changes in institutional design.
V. Conclusion
The American criminal justice system has much to commend.
It achieves generally accurate results at relatively low costs. It
also continues to operate with reasonable continuity in all sorts of
political climates. However, it clearly has been shown to fail with
regard to accuracy of results in a substantial number of cases, as
discovered by the fortuity of the advent of DNA technology.'7 0
Moreover, there is every reason to suspect the numerous erroneous
convictions that have been documented are but a small fraction of
past erroneous convictions that will never be detected because no
DNA evidence was found or preserved or of future unjust
prosecutions for similar reasons of lack of scientific proof.
Despite its strengths, the American system neither reasonably
fulfills the adversarial ideal, nor is it the best version of that ideal
that is politically and economically practical in contemporary
America. I note three reforms that would provide obvious
improvement: more funding for indigent defense, broader
discovery, and independent review within the prosecutors' office
of either apparently problematic cases or all cases. The first of
these is potentially costly in terms of dollars, while the other two
169 See O'Brien, supra note 83, at 1010-12 (explaining accepting psychological
learning); id. at 1029 (explaining experimental findings).
170 See Garrett, supra note 3, at 57 (stating that over 200 people have been
exonerated by DNA evidence after conviction).
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are not. All should be undertaken, and in their absence, the
failures of our alleged adversarial model are real, important, and
needlessly extensive.
Finally, all systems should learn from emerging research that
notes the significance of assigning the investigative task to parties
who are judged by process and fairness, rather than those who are
judged by outcomes. This feature is an inherent superior
characteristic of the theoretical design of inquisitorial model, and
inversely, a flaw in the adversarial model. However, the true
value of this basic insight, like many points learned from
comparative legal analysis, is an insight that is most valuable
when employed in sophisticated ways in the context of domestic
systems, taking into account all their complications and
complexities and focused on the task of achieving the possible.
